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PANEL DISCUSSION: FINANCING MEXICAN
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT'
MODERATOR: JOHN STEPHENSON, ESQ*"
PANELISTS: LIC. MIGUEL JAUREGUI ROJAS, CARLOS MALPICA
HERNANDEZ, CAROL MATES, GERARDO FREIRE ALVARADO AND
IIqlGO DE LA BORBOLLA
JOHN ROGERS:' It seems to me there is some contradiction in the concept of the
guarantee trust because if the idea is to transfer a portion or all of a debtor's assets
to the guarantee trust to guarantee the debtor's obligations, how does that avoid
automatically putting the debtor into a state of insolvency?
MIGUEL JAUREGUI ROJAS: First, if we were talking in the context of the old
guarantee trust, I think that this would be the case and that is why it never worked.
If you were going to set up a guarantee trust, you would have to obtain all of the
assets of the borrower to guarantee it. All of the assets had to be obtained under the
old guarantee trust in order to provide further recourse against the debtor. So, since
you needed to have all of the debtor's assets, it is likely that the debtor would face
insolvency. That is why the old vehicle never worked.
The new vehicle is different because it is not all encompassing and you have the
right to go to the debtor for more if what is originally secured is not sufficient. The
real issue is to keep the new guarantee trust as amended, because it works by
leaving some of the debtor's property free to guarantee other debts or to have cash
available. Ultimately the old trust was the equivalent of pre-pack 2 in an insolvency
procedure; basically all of the debtor's assets were tied up and the debt was prepacked. With the old trust if the debtor goes insolvent, the debtor's assets are lost
to the creditor.
OCTAVIO CARAVAJAL: 3 This question is for Carol Mates. When you are
evaluating the environmental viability of a project for which financing has been
requested, how satisfied is the International Finance Corporation (IFC) with the
Mexican environmental laws and regulations, or do you point out other certificates
to be accomplished or gained by those companies in order to evaluate that there is
an environmental possibility in those projects?
CAROL MATES: The answer really is a technical one depending on how
Mexican law comports with World Bank Group environmental standards and
environmental and social policies. The World Bank Group now has a complete set
of environmental standards and guidelines for the particular enterprises,4 and in
some areas that IFC finances and the World Bank does not, IFC has its own
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John Rogers is a partner in the firm of Strasburger & Price, S.C. in Mexico City.
A pre-pack is a chapter 11 bankruptcy case that the parties have already worked out.
Octavio Caravajal is a partner in the firm of Vera, Caravajal & Sosa S.C. in Mexico City.
World Bank Group Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, 1998, available at

http://www.WorldBankGroup.com (last visited March 31, 2004).
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standards. LFC's environmental specialists will assure that the project meets the
World Bank Group's environmental standards. So in any particular country, they
will look at the specific sector and local requirements. In some cases the local
requirements are more stringent than the World Bank requirements, and whether the
project is a new project or an existing project, it will be required to meet the higher
of the World Bank standards or local standards. In other places, the local law is not
up to the World Bank standards, and so they will have to meet the World Bank
standards. Legally what they will do is say, "You have to meet the World Bank
standards," but in the loan documentation it will also say that you have to comply
with all the laws, including environmental laws.
I once worked on a drinking water project where the host country had terrific
standards that were higher than the standards set forth by the World Bank. The JFC
was not sure if the project could comport with the local legislation because of its
stringent requirements. Each case really is specifically analyzed and categorized
A, B or C, and IFC has specific rules. 5
JAIME CORTES: 6 I also have a question for Carol Mates. Can the credit
enhancement scheme of the Tlalnepantla water project be repeated in a private
project such as a bond issue for housing projects?
MATES: Yes, in principle it could be, so long as all other IFC policy and financial
requirements were met.
MICHAEL OWEN:7 This question is for Carol Mates. You mentioned during
your presentation that IFC rules indicate that the IFC has to be a passive investor
and cannot take a management control position. I am wondering, in a situation
where you are in a workout, are you able to work with the other creditors if in fact
the real problem is the management and you need to get rid of the management?
MATES: Yes. Once IFC deems the project to be in jeopardy the rules requiring
IFC to be a "passive investor" are no longer applicable. There is a specific
provision in our charter that basically says the corporation shall not be constrained
by this charter restriction in a jeopardy situation, permitting it to do what it needs
to in order to get its money back.8 So we join with other creditors to enforce our
remedies as a creditor, and that is often where our ability to go to governments and
engage in discussions as a quasi-diplomat can be helpful. We have had to do this
in some East Asian countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis of the late
1990s. During and after the severe economic problems following the 1997 crisis,
lenders went to the courts to enforce their loan instruments or mortgages. The first
thing that some of the borrowers did was to try to persuade the courts to favor local

5. For further information on the IFC and the IFC's rules related to standards see the IFC's official website
at http://www.ifc.org (last visited March 31, 2004).
6. Jaime Cortds is a partner in the firm of Mijares, Angoitea, Cortds y Fuentes S.C. in Mexico City.
7. Michael Owen is a partner in the firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker L.L.P. in Los Angeles,
California.
8. For more information see the IFC Articles of Agreement, available at http://www.ifc.org (last visited
March 31, 2004).
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interests over those of foreigners, sometimes successfully. IFC actually took some
of the borrowers to court in those cases. We had a very long case in one East Asian
country with a company that did not want to give up its assets to a foreclosure but
was not paying any creditors. The company really pulled political strings to prevent
the bankruptcy trustee from effectively taking over the company. This has lasted
approximately two years, but we have led a creditor group. We had a similar case
in at least one other East Asian country.
ROBERT BARNETT: 9 My question is for Carlos Malpica, and it is in regard to
the role of the attorney in a publicly financed transaction. In the United States and
many otherjurisdictions, often there will be an attorney or law firm representing the
issuer, and a different attorney or law firm representing the underwriter, and we
have not seen this thus far in Mexico. I wanted to get your comments on why that
has not happened and if in your opinion it is possible it will happen in the future?
CARLOS MALPICA HERNANDEZ: During the 1980s and 1990s in the
Mexican practice there used to be one lawyer for the underwriter and one lawyer
for the issuer. I think that because of the cost involved one single lawyer acts for
the issuer and provides a legal opinion on the transaction involved, and the
underwriter has internal counsel. In my experience it is very rare to have separate
lawyers for the underwriter and the issuer. In the last five years or so, I have only
represented an underwriter once, which was Santander in the securitization of the
payroll tax of the State of Mexico.
BARNETT: This question is for the Santander representatives. Do you see the
same or similar situation as part of the fiscal reform in Mexico where public finance
transactions would yield interest-free income for investors, like the tax-free
transactions that you see in the United States and other countries?
GERARDO FREIRE ALVARADO: I expect that currently all the issuers,
including the government, need to pay taxes. I do not think that in the years to
come we will see the Mexican government change the rules regarding public
finance transactions and tax exemptions.
JOHN STEPHENSON: You mentioned the restrictions on foreign investment,
foreign ownership of some bonds, and then you mentioned that next year you think
you are going to get a repo authorization. Can you not then buy the bonds in
Mexico and resell them to foreigners or package something like that?
INIGODELA BORBOLLA: Basically, the restriction comes from issuance from
states and municipalities. You can resell other bonds freely. It would be wonderful
if we could find some legal structure in which we would be able to package bonds
from the states and municipalities and sell them to other investors. At the moment,
we believe that there is enough money in Mexico to finance these kinds of public

9. Robert Barnett is an associate attorney in the firm of Cacheaux, Cavazos & Newton, L.L.P. in San
Antonio, Texas.
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works, and therefore we have not explored the possibility of finding some way to
overturn the restriction because there has been money to finance these states and
municipalities.
FREIRE: Tlalnepantla is a good example where this kind of limitation can be
avoided.
DAVID SPENCER: ' This question is for Miguel Jduregui. I was intrigued by the
characteristic of the amendments that you mentioned whereby the parties might
make their own tailor-made rules of foreclosure, including a non-judicial process,
which seems like a dream come true. Has anybody done this yet as far as you
know? Will there be some standardized procedures, perhaps, developed by the
Mexican bar or circulated in some fashion? How do you see that developing?
JAUREGUI: The main challenge within the Mexican legal system has been how
to enforce things and how to follow a procedure before the judiciary when there are
no standards of procedure, as you know them, in the Anglo-Saxon court system.
The reason that the mortgage guarantee was successful for a number of years was
because there were standards of procedure associated with it and people understood
what the court meant and what the creditors and debtors expected. Now these
instruments have their own execution processes. The public policy stated by the
government when they proposed the amendments to Congress will allow for a much
more agile execution and foreclosure of these instruments. Now, it is daunting at
this point as to how much the Amparo" resistance will be there and whether or not
Mexican litigators are going to find loopholes so that automatic foreclosure cannot
really be enforced. However, these amendments will prevail and resolutions from
the Supreme Court or district courts will soon uphold these processes. Now the
issue will be to what degree do the instruments have standards of process built into
them similar to those the judiciary would want built in, so that doubt is eradicated.
But it is, as you say, new and we are going to have to be sure that it works.
ROGERS: I had a question related to the constitutional restriction on foreign
financing and foreign currency by states and municipalities. Looking at the
structure of the Tlalnepantla project, there is, at least indirectly, a foreign
component to the financing. I was wondering to what extent there was an
obligation, running directly or indirectly, from the municipality to Dexia and the
IFC?
MATES: There is none.
ROGERS: This question is for Carlos Malpica. What if, in a municipal financing,
there is a foreign guarantee, and the financing source is originally domestic, from
the Mexican capital markets or a Mexican lender, but there is a foreign entity that
10. David Spencer is an attorney in Snohomish, Washington.
11. If a litigant has a claim based on a violation of a constitutional right, the litigant may bring an Amparo
proceeding, which is an appeal to the federal tribunal. If the court finds that the rights of the litigant were violated
the ruling is binding only on the litigants before the court.
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is guaranteeing the debt. Does that potentially run the risk of violating the
constitutional restriction if, upon payment by the guarantor, which is then
subrogated to the rights of the original creditors, the obligations run directly from
the municipality to a foreign creditor?
MALPICA-. Yes, I think that the risk of violating the constitutional restriction
would certainly exist. However, please note that there are two opinions regarding
the issue. The first one is that it would be a non-direct debt to a creditor, or
guarantor in this case, and therefore in breach of the constitutional restriction for
states and municipalities. The second one is that if the transaction is structured
through a trust without recourse to the state and/or municipality (which I understand
was the case at Tlalnepantla), it would not violate the constitutional restriction.
RICHARD KRUMBEIN: 2 Carol Mates mentioned that IFC has financed five
independent power producers (IPPs) in Mexico. In the case of these IPPs, when you
go through the cash-flow evaluation, are you looking both at the Power Purchase
Agreements with the Comisi6n Federalde Electricidad(CFE) as well as the private
sector? Do you have two different sources in many cases, or do you exclude CFE
from the equation?
MATES: No, the IPPs IFC has done to date have all been with CFE. We are
looking at some under the auto-producer scheme and are hoping that we can do
something more under this scheme. We need a company that has good credit in
order to finance an EPP with that company as an off-taker under the auto-producers
scheme. I understand that there was a supreme court ruling within the last year or
so on the whole auto-producer scheme, knocking down the regulations which would
have amplified that scheme and the ability of auto-producers to sell to CFE.
DAVID HURTADO BADIOLA:13 This question is for Miguel Jiuregui and
Carlos Malpica. I am interested in your opinions on the use of arbitration as a
possible device to circumvent or avoid the judicial obstacles to enforce or foreclose
this new mechanism of guarantees.
JAUREGUI: I think that what we are debating currently is whether payment
obligations can be arbitrated and whether, because of the nature of the obligation,
you really need arbitration, or is it easier to go to a court of law. Whether one
should arbitrate or not has been a dispute in the Mexican bar for a number of years.
Members of the bar are coming to some consensus that it makes sense to arbitrate
precisely to avoid certain issues, albeit if we go to arbitration we have to worry
about public policy issues. There are many issues underlying the proper execution
of arbitral awards that are of concern today, and so therefore, I do not know if
arbitration per se is a cure-all because the judiciary, in the end, will put the force of
law into it. But certainly if we were talking in the context of arbitral awards issued
in international arbitration, I would feel more comfortable. Arbitral awards issued

12. Richard Krumbein is a partner in the firm of Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. in Denver, Colorado.
13. David Hurtado Badiola is a partner in the firm of Jduregui Navarrete Nadar y Rojas S.C. in Mexico City.
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for payment obligations in the local scenario would probably be less likely to be
enforced per se in verbatim than the obligations of a foreclosure in a new instrument
like the guarantee trust. This is my perception, but it is really hard to say until the
judiciary acts on the issue.
MALPICA: I think Miguel explained it perfectly. The only thing that I would like
to address is that in the future we are going to see fellow attorneys trying to run
down and destroy that provision as unconstitutional. In the meantime I would rather
recommend that my clients go through the normal litigation channels until this
arbitration clause is tested.
MATES: If I can just add as a lender's counsel, I do not think lenders would want
to arbitrate issues of payment or foreclosure of security in Mexico. So it may be of
interest to some lenders, but I believe IFC would never accept it.
ROGERS: On this issue of enforcement, where you have a debt obligation, loan
obligation, investment obligation or any such obligation, under a document in which
the parties have submitted to U.S. law and jurisdiction or to Mexican law and
jurisdiction, but you have a transaction secured by collateral, let us assume that the
collateral protection is currently much better than it was a few years ago, a nonpossessory pledge or guarantee trust, or whatever. That guarantee or collateral
security enforcement, presumably, would have to be under Mexican law and
Mexican jurisdiction. If the underlying debt obligation were to be enforced in the
United States and then brought to Mexico for enforcement in Mexico with collateral
protection, how would you see the procedure?
JAUREGUI: First, when trying to enforce Mexican issues in a court of law other
than a Mexican court of law, you would have to distinguish between real property
rights and personal property rights. It is much more feasible to enforce personal
property rights in a court of law other than that of a Mexican court of law. The
restriction there would be that you comply with Mexican due process of law
principals so that you do not end up with a perfect decree of a foreign court that
cannot be enforced in Mexico because of the Amparo proceedings that we would
have available as Mexicans if you did not follow due process of law.
First and foremost, notifying and serving process on the defendant in a manner
other than that prescribed by Mexican law may be a nightmare for a court outside
of Mexico that is trying to enforce a personal property right. So, suppose that the
problem of notice and service are circumvented, and therefore it is a personal
property right that we are trying to enforce in a Mexican court of law. You would
go through the proceeding law and look at whether the criteria to enforce a foreign
decree are met--principally, public policy. And if that is the case the decree will be
enforced. Now if there is collateral that may have an in rem guarantee, we have the
problem of applying Mexican law in a court of law outside of Mexico in the
proceedings, and then bringing that decree back to Mexico and asking a Mexican
judge to enforce the award while agreeing that that the standards of procedure of
enforcement of a real property right were done properly. For example, a Uniform
Commercial Code filing would not be sufficient if you do not have it coupled with
a Mexican type of collateral or a guarantee that is backed up by an in rem guarantee
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here, pursuant to Mexican law and enforceable in Mexico. So I do not see that a
U.S. court would throw out the enforcement of the collateral with real property,
necessarily. But the issue is whether the Mexican court will accept the criteria of
the foreign court as to how that foreclosure should have taken place and the
standards of procedure, obviously, in Mexico, vis-A-vis the standards of procedure
followed in the foreign court.
This is a very difficult question you asked, and in my view probably unlikely to
occur. First, if I am advising my client, I would rather have a promissory note made
pursuant to Mexican terms because it is easier. Second, if I am going through the
enforcement of covenants within a loan agreement, then I would probably advise
my client to put that in a public instrument so that he could sue under the expedited
proceedings in Mexico with the first certified copy. Lastly, if I am going to have
an in rem guarantee, I would rather have a Mexican document that says Mexican
law and looks to Mexican standards of proc edure, because otherwise, I think I
would have created, and I say this with respect, a hell of a mess for my client.
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